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Autonomy,	Residence,	and	Return*	
	
David	Lefkowitz		
	
Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Richmond,	U.S.A.	
	
This	article	argues	that	those	unjustly	displaced	from	a	particular	
territory	T	cannot	involuntarily	lose	their	rights	to	reside	there,	or,	as	
a	consequence,	their	rights	of	return	to	it,	even	if	they	develop	
territorially	grounded	conceptions	of	the	good	where	they	now	reside.		
The	contrary	position	fails	to	accord	the	unjustly	displaced	the	respect	
due	to	them	in	virtue	of	their	personal	autonomy.		Facts	commonly	
alleged	to	justify	the	supersession	of	rights	of	return	to	T	only	provide	
evidence	that	the	unjustly	displaced	have	abandoned	their	rights	to	
reside	there,	or	would	do	so	if	given	a	just	opportunity	to	return.		The	
rights	of	those	now	residing	in	T,	which	author	argues	may	include	
those	responsible	for	the	unjust	displacement,	may	limit	the	right	of	
return	but	are	unlikely	to	preclude	it	altogether.	
	
Keywords:	Corrective	justice;	migration,	occupancy;	right	of	return;	
Stilz,	supersession;	territorial	rights;	territory;	Waldron.	
	
Introduction	
Contemporary	debates	over	the	right	to	reside	in	or	occupy	a	particular	territory	
largely	revolve	around	the	answers	theorists	give	to	three	questions.	First,	who	
enjoys	the	right	in	question,	individuals	or	groups,	and	if	the	latter,	what	sort	of	
groups?	Second,	how	do	agents	acquire	a	right	to	reside	in	a	particular	territory?	In	
virtue	of	what	relationship	to	a	particular	place	does	an	individual	or	group	come	to	
enjoy	a	right	to	reside	there,	and	how	exactly	does	that	relationship	give	rise	to	a	
right?		Third,	if	agents	suffer	a	violation	of	their	right	to	reside	in	a	particular	
territory,	i.e.	if	they	are	unjustly	displaced	from	it,	for	how	long	and	under	what	
conditions	do	they	enjoy	a	right	of	return	to	it?		In	this	paper	I	focus	almost	
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exclusively	on	the	last	of	these	three	questions,	offering	a	novel	account	of	an	
individual’s	right	of	return	to	the	particular	territory	from	which	he	or	she	was	
unjustly	displaced.		If	successful,	however,	my	argument	lends	some	credence	to	the	
answers	to	the	first	two	questions	I	largely	assume	in	this	paper,	namely	that	the	
right	of	residence	is	an	individual	right	grounded	in	a	person’s	exercise	of	his	or	her	
capacity	to	form	and	pursue	a	territorially	grounded	conception	of	the	good.			
I	begin	in	section	I	by	drawing	on	the	work	of	Anna	Stilz	and	Jeremy	Waldron	
to	characterize	the	connection	between	personal	autonomy	and	a	particular	
territory.		I	then	argue	contra	Stilz	and	Waldron	that	those	individuals	unjustly	
displaced	from	a	particular	territory	(and,	perhaps,	their	descendants)	cannot	
involuntarily	lose	their	rights	to	reside	there,	and	so	their	right	to	return	to	it.	To	
maintain	otherwise	gives	the	unjust	displacers	unwarranted	control	over	the	
displaced	individual’s	formation	and	pursuit	of	their	life	plans,	and	so	fails	to	accord	
them	the	respect	they	are	due	in	virtue	of	their	autonomy.			
Though	individuals	cannot	involuntarily	lose	their	rights	to	return	to	a	
territory	from	which	they	were	unjustly	expelled,	they	may	voluntarily	abandon	or	
renounce	those	rights,	or	other	considerations	of	justice	may	preclude	their	
exercise.		I	develop	each	of	these	possibilities	in	turn.		In	section	II	I	contend	that	
those	unjustly	displaced	from	territory	T	retain	a	right	to	reside	there	if	and	only	if	
return	to	it	continues	to	figure	among	their	ends,	which	requires	in	turn	that	they	
adopt	some	means	to	realizing	it.		I	then	argue	that	many	facts	commonly	associated	
with	the	loss	of	rights	to	reside	in	T	do	not	themselves	entail	that	loss;	rather,	they	
typically	provide	evidence	that	the	unjustly	displaced	individuals	have	abandoned	
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their	rights	to	reside	in	T,	or	that	they	would	do	so	if	given	a	just	opportunity	to	
return.		In	section	III	I	examine	whether	the	claims	of	those	now	living	in	T	might	
limit	or	even	rule	out	altogether	the	return	of	the	unjustly	displaced.		I	consider	two	
types	of	claims:	those	grounded	in	the	ability	of	the	current	residents	to	meet	their	
basic	needs,	and	those	grounded	in	their	right	to	reside	in	that	particular	territory.		
Among	those	with	the	latter	claim,	I	argue,	may	be	some	of	those	who	perpetrated	
or	knowingly	took	advantage	of	the	unjust	displacement	of	T’s	original	rightful	
residents.		I	conclude	that	while	neither	type	of	claim	is	likely	to	preclude	altogether	
the	return	of	those	wrongfully	driven	from	T,	their	recognition	may	lead	the	unjustly	
displaced	to	abandon	their	claims	to	return	to	it.				
I	
Writing	separately,	Anna	Stilz	(2011)	and	Jeremy	Waldron	(1992,	2002,	
2004)	argue	that	respect	for	individuals’	personal	autonomy	--(the	exercise	of)	their	
ability	to	form	and	pursue	conceptions	of	the	good--	involves	recognizing	their	
rights	to	reside	in	a	particular	territory.	Stilz	(2011),	for	example,	maintains	that:			
Occupancy	of	territory	is	connected	to	autonomy	because	it	plays	an	
important	role	in	almost	all	of	our	plans.	We	build	our	lives	on	the	
assumption	that	our	goals,	relationships,	and	pursuits	will	not	be	
unexpectedly	destroyed	through	forced	displacement.	If	I	structure	
my	goals	and	choices	against	the	background	of	continuing	legal	
residence	in	a	particular	territory,	and	I	am	there	through	no	fault	of	
my	own,	then	respect	for	my	autonomy	tells	in	favor	of	allowing	me	to	
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remain	there	since	it	would	be	impossible	to	move	me	without	
damage	to	nearly	all	my	life	plans	(pp.	583-584).1	
Waldron	(1992;	2004)	tells	a	similar	story	regarding	the	acquisition	(and	continued	
possession)	of	property	rights	over	particular	objects,	and	he	seems	to	suggest	an	
extension	of	the	argument	to	rights	of	residence	in	a	particular	territory.	He	writes:		
an	individual,	P,	who	takes	possession	of	an	object	or	a	piece	of	land	
and	who	works	on	it,	alters	it,	and	uses	it,	makes	it	in	effect	a	part	of	
her	life,	a	pivotal	point	in	her	thinking,	planning,	and	action.		She	
shapes	it	in	a	certain	way…	so	as	to	allow	it	to	perform	a	certain	role	
in	her	life	and	activity	not	only	now	but	in	the	future.		If	someone	else,	
Q,	comes	along	and	seizes	the	land,	taking	it	from	P	without	her	
consent,	then	the	whole	structure	of	action	is	disrupted	(18;	261).		
Speaking	of	a	person	presently	in	rightful	possession	of	an	object,	Waldron	(1992)	
states:	‘it	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	continued	possession	of	the	object	might	
be	indispensible	to	the	possessor’s	autonomy	and	that	an	attack	on	possession	is	an	
attack	on	autonomy’	(p.	19).	
As	autonomous	agents	individuals	form	and	pursue	life	plans	—structures	of	
goals,	projects,	and	relationship—	that	in	practically	all	cases	have	a	territorial	
dimension.2		The	way	of	life	people	lead	rests	on	their	settled	expectations	regarding	
residence	in,	and	movement	throughout	(and	perhaps	in	and	out	of),	some	
geographically	bounded	space.	Clearly	this	is	true	of	those	who	reside	in	modern	
states,	but	it	seems	true	as	well	of	those	who	do	not;	many	people	living	in	so-called	
failed	states,	for	instance,	appear	to	form	and	pursue	territorially	grounded	
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conceptions	of	the	good,	as	do	individuals	who	seek	to	remove	themselves	from	
existing	societies	as	much	as	they	can.	All	else	equal,	then,	respect	for	people	as	
autonomous	agents	requires	at	a	minimum	that	one	refrain	from	deliberately	
displacing	them	from	(some	portion	of)	the	territory	to	which	the	way	of	life	they	
lead	is	essentially	tied.	In	other	words,	individuals	enjoy	a	prima	facie	right	to	
residence	in	a	particular	territory;	one	that	includes	at	least	a	claim	against	forcible	
displacement	from	it,	in	virtue	of	their	ability	to	set	ends	and	adopt	means	to	them,	
and	the	fact	that	they	have	adopted	ends	that	either	directly	involve	or	presume	
continued	residence	in	that	territory.3	
The	case	in	which,	intuitively,	it	seems	clearest	that	a	person	enjoys	a	right	to	
reside	in	a	particular	territory	T	is	one	in	which	she	resides	there	now,	has	done	so	
for	quite	some	time,	perhaps	even	her	whole	life,	and	in	which	the	way	of	life	she	
leads	is	fundamentally	tied	to	residence	in	T.		Alas	the	forcible	displacement	of	
people	who	meet	these	conditions	is	an	all	too	common	feature	of	human	history.	
Few	dispute	that	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	such	an	unjust	act	the	displaced	
individuals	enjoy	a	prima	facie	right	of	return.	But	Waldron	and	Stilz,	and	others	as	
well,	also	maintain	that	the	right	to	reside	in	T,	which	provides	the	basis	for	a	right	
of	return	to	it,	can	“fade”	over	time.4		This	conclusion	might	be	defended	on	
epistemic	grounds;	for	example,	the	challenge	of	defending	specific	claims	regarding	
the	migration	patterns	that	would	have	occurred	absent	the	perpetration	of	various	
past	injustices,	which	might	be	relevant	to	determining	whether	any	present	claim	
to	a	remedy	can	be	justified,	and	what	form	it	ought	to	take.	Likewise	the	claim	that	
the	descendants	of	those	forcibly	displaced	from	T	have	a	right	to	reside	there,	
	 6	
though	they	neither	suffered	the	injustice	of	the	initial	expulsion	nor	have	ever	lived	
in	T,	stands	in	need	of	defense	(Waldron,	1992,	p.	19).	If	one	cannot	be	provided,	
then	claims	to	return	might	fade	with	the	passing	of	the	generation	that	actually	
suffered	the	wrong	of	forcible	displacement.5	My	concern	here,	however,	is	with	
another	reason	Stilz	and	Waldron	both	give	for	an	agent’s	loss	of	a	right	to	reside	in	
the	territory	from	which	she	was	unjustly	displaced,	namely	their	claim	that	
individuals	have	a	right	to	reside	in	a	particular	territory	only	if	the	conception	of	
the	good	they	currently	pursue	presumes	residence	there.			
To	the	extent	that	people	unjustly	displaced	from	T	form	and	pursue	plans	
premised	on	residence	elsewhere,	it	is	in	that	territory	–	call	it	T2	–	and	only	that	
territory	that	Waldron	and	Stilz	maintain	they	have	a	right	to	reside.		For	instance,	
Waldron	(1992)	writes:		
if	something	was	taken	from	me	decades	ago,	the	claim	that	it	now	
forms	the	center	of	my	life	and	that	it	is	still	indispensible	to	the	
exercise	of	my	autonomy	is	much	less	credible.		For	I	must	have	
developed	some	structure	of	subsistence.		And	that	will	be	where	my	
efforts	have	gone	and	where	my	planning	and	my	practical	thinking	
have	been	focused.		I	may	of	course	yearn	for	the	lost	resource	and	
spend	a	lot	of	time	wishing	I	had	it	back.		I	may	even	organize	my	life	
around	the	campaign	for	its	restoration.		But	that	is	not	the	same	thing	
as	the	basis	of	the	original	claim.		The	original	entitlement	is	based	on	
the	idea	that	I	have	organized	my	life	around	the	use	of	this	object,	not	
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that	I	have	organized	my	life	around	the	specific	project	of	hanging	on	
to	it	or	getting	it	back	(p.	19;	see	also	2004,	p.	261).		
Similarly,	Stilz	(2011)	maintains:		
…each	person	has	a	claim	to	stable	legal	residence	in	any	state	whose	
territory	he	resides	(for	the	long	term)	though	no	fault	of	his	own,	and	
he	ought	to	be	treated	by	that	state	as	an	equal	citizen	and	provided	
the	basic	rights	and	opportunities	necessary	to	framing	and	revising	
his	life	plans.	Where	this	claim	is	met,	the	wrong	of	displacement	is	
superseded.		Where	it	is	not	met,	the	right	of	return	on	the	part	of	the	
displaced	population	continues	in	force	(p.	586).6		
As	these	quotations	clearly	illustrate,	Stilz	and	Waldron	take	the	use	an	agent	
presently	makes,	or	at	least	recently	made,	of	the	place	where	she	resides	in	the	
formation	and	pursuit	of	her	conception	of	the	good	as	the	basis	for	her	right	to	
reside	there.	The	more	she	puts	down	roots	in	one	place,	the	less	the	various	actual	
relationships,	goals,	and	projects	that	together	constitute	her	life	plan	are	tied	to	
residence	elsewhere.	At	some	point,	we	might	say,	her	life	is	here,	not	where	she	
once	lived.		
Though	they	make	a	promising	start,	Stilz	and	Waldron	both	fail	to	give	due	
consideration	to	the	fact	that	unjust	displacement	frequently	involves	not	only	the	
initial	injustice	of	involuntary	expulsion	from	a	given	territory,	but	also	the	
persistent	injustice	of	refusing	to	allow	the	victims	of	the	initial	injustice	to	return	to	
that	territory.	This	leads	them	to	offer	a	truncated	account	of	the	connection	
between	respect	for	personal	autonomy	and	individuals’	rights	to	reside	in	a	
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particular	territory.	Specifically,	Waldron	and	Stilz	treat	residence	in	a	territory	as	a	
mere	means	to	the	realization	of	various	ends	(e.g.,	to	the	pursuit	of	specific	goals	or	
projects).		For	many	people,	however,	particular	territories	are	not	merely	means	to	
the	pursuit	of	a	good	life,	but	integral	to	the	very	way	of	life	they	pursue.	Respect	for	
a	person’s	autonomy	requires	not	only	respect	for	his	or	her	ability	to	use	objects	or	
physical	spaces	as	means	to	their	ends,	but	also	respect	for	his	or	her	ability	to	set	
ends.	Here	the	relevant	end	is	the	pursuit	of	a	territorially	grounded	conception	of	
the	good;	that	is,	the	pursuit	of	a	way	of	life	located	in	a	particular	place.	The	
fundamental	claim	involved	in	a	right	of	return	is	to	the	living	of	a	way	of	life	–	a	
matter	of	the	ends	a	person	sets	–	that	she	has	been	unjustly	denied.	The	fact	that	a	
person	does	not	need	to	reside	in	the	particular	territory	T	from	which	she	(or,	
possibly,	her	forebears)	was	unjustly	expelled	in	order	to	pursue	most	of	her	
current	plans	is	beside	the	point.	What	she	asserts	is	the	right	to	formulate	and	
pursue	life	plans	premised	on	current	and	future	residence	in	T,	a	right	she	enjoys	
because	she	(or,	possibly,	her	forbearers)	once	rightfully	resided	in	T	and	she	has	
not	voluntarily	abandoned	the	claim	to	do	so	again.			
The	position	Stilz	and	Waldron	defend	denies	those	unjustly	displaced	from	
T	the	full	exercise	of	autonomy	or	of	authorship	over	their	lives.	Instead,	it	gives	
those	who	unjustly	displaced	them	and	who	persist	in	the	unjust	denial	to	the	
displaced	of	their	rights	to	reside	in	T	an	unwarranted	control	over	the	displaced	
persons’	formation	and	pursuit	of	their	life	plans.	Of	course,	the	choices,	actions,	or	
life	plans	of	other	agents	regularly	constrain	my	choices,	actions,	and	the	life	plans	I	
form	and	pursue.	As	long	as	others	act	within	their	rights,	however,	the	limitations	
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on	my	exercise	of	autonomy	that	follow	are	not	unjust.	As	Alon	Harel	(2004,	p.	337)	
notes,	the	right	to	return	to	T	is	not	the	same	thing	as	a	right	to	settle	in	T.	The	latter	
would	treat	the	fact	that	one	wishes	to	pursue	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	
grounded	in	T	as	sufficient	to	generate	a	right	to	residence	in	T.		Yet	on	any	of	a	
range	of	views	involving	rights	of	residence	in	combination	with	property	rights	
and/or	rights	to	political	self-determination	that	justify	closed	borders,	others’	
exercise	of	their	rights	may	preclude	my	acquiring	a	right	to	reside	in	T	even	if	I	
wish	to	pursue	a	conception	of	the	good	that	is	territorially	grounded	there.	That	is	
not	true	in	the	case	under	consideration	here,	however,	since	by	hypothesis	the	
unjust	displacers	do	not	have	a	right	to	displace	and	to	deny	return	to	those	who	
rightfully	resided	in	T.			
Properly	construed,	the	autonomy-based	account	of	the	right	of	residence	
does	not	entail	that	a	person	displaced	from	T	looses	her	right	to	reside	there	if	her	
present	plans	are	not	premised	on	residence	in	T.	Nevertheless,	two	different	
scenarios	can	play	out	while	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T	are	denied	their	right	
to	return	to	it,	both	of	which	have	implications	for	their	right	to	reside	there.	First,	
some	or	all	of	those	individuals	unjustly	expelled	from	T	may	abandon	their	right	to	
residence	in	it;	that	is,	they	may	foreswear	any	right	of	return	to	T.		Second,	the	very	
possibility	of	return	to	T	may	be	increasingly	constrained	by	other	considerations	of	
justice;	in	particular,	the	ability	of	those	now	living	in	T	to	meet	their	basic	needs,	
and	their	right	to	reside	in	that	particular	territory.		Both	considerations	hold,	I	will	
argue,	even	for	those	who	unjustly	displaced	those	rightfully	residing	in	T,	or	who	
unjustly	denied	them	return	to	it.		I	explore	each	of	these	scenarios	in	turn.	
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II	
Personal	autonomy	consists	in	(the	exercise	of)	an	ability	to	set	ends	as	well	
as	(the	exercise	of)	the	capacity	to	select	means	to	them.	Echoing	Kant,	albeit	with	
an	addendum,	I	suggest	that	to	have	an	end	necessitates	that	one	adopt	some	means	
to	it	unless	wrongful	treatment	from	others	prevents	you	from	doing	so.		It	follows	
that	people’s	actions	frequently	serve	as	both	conditions	for	and	evidence	of	their	
ends.	For	example,	if	those	individuals	forcibly	displaced	from	T	clearly	make	it	a	
central	part	of	the	life	plans	they	form	and	pursue	in	T2	to	assert	their	rights	to	
reside	in	T	and	to	work	toward	return	to	it,	then	we	have	good	evidence	that	
residence	in	T	comprises	one	of	their	ends.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	those	forcibly	
displaced	from	T	assert	no	right	of	return	to	it,	nor	make	any	effort	to	realize	such	a	
state	of	affairs,	then	we	have	good	reason	to	conclude	that	residence	in	T	is	no	
longer	among	their	ends.	In	this	case,	we	ought	to	conclude	that	they	have	
abandoned	their	right	to	residence	in	T.		
The	case	of	German	nationals	displaced	from	what	is	now	western	Poland	
provides	a	plausible	example	of	people	unjustly	displaced	from	a	territory	
abandoning	their	right	of	residence	in	it.		Stilz	(2011,	pp.	585-586)	asserts	that	the	
descendants	of	Germans	who	were	forced	out	of	Western	Poland	in	1945	have	no	
claim	to	occupy	lands	that	their	unjustly	displaced	ancestors	once	occupied	because	
they	are	now	incorporated	as	citizens	in	some	other	legitimate	state,	with	an	
expectation	of	continuing	to	reside	there.7	For	reasons	that	should	be	clear,	I	think	
these	conditions	are	insufficient	to	undermine	the	displaced	Germans’	right	of	
return.	However,	I	submit	that	we	have	good	reason	to	conclude	that	the	vast	
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majority	of	those	displaced	Germans	who	settled	in	West	Germany	(and	their	
descendants)	likely	abandoned	any	claim	to	reside	in	Western	Poland	within	two	or	
three	decades	of	their	forcible	expulsion.	Though	they	initially	formed	a	pressure	
group	that	advocated	for	their	right	of	return	to	the	territories	from	which	they	had	
been	unjustly	displaced,	and	though	the	assertion	of	a	right	of	return	was	an	official	
part	of	West	German	foreign	policy	under	Adenauer,	the	‘so-called	“economic	
miracle”	in	West	Germany	gave	them,	in	little	more	than	a	decade,	a	much	better	
material	life	than	they	had	ever	enjoyed	before’	(Evans,	2012).	Though	no	doubt	still	
resentful	of	the	treatment	they	had	suffered,	I	suggest	that	few	of	these	displaced	
German	nationals	would	have	taken	the	opportunity	to	return	to	their	former	
homes	even	had	it	been	offered	to	them.8	
	 	As	the	above	addendum	to	Kant’s	dictum	regarding	ends	and	means	
indicates,	we	must	be	careful	when	drawing	the	conclusion	that	people	displaced	
from	T	no	longer	have	residence	in	T	as	an	end.	Those	unjustly	displaced	from	a	
territory	in	which	they	rightfully	reside	may	be	too	consumed	with	meeting	their	
basic	needs	to	assert	their	right	to	reside	in	T	and	to	work	for	its	realization	(though	
in	fact	even	the	most	desperate	often	do).	Alternatively,	those	unjustly	displaced	
from	T	may	think	the	odds	against	the	recognition	of	their	rights	to	reside	there	so	
unfavorable	that	they	judge	the	opportunity	cost	of	efforts	at	return	to	be	too	high	to	
warrant	undertaking	them.	This	state	of	affairs,	too,	seems	to	me	to	be	relatively	
rare;	at	most,	very	long	odds	at	gaining	return	may	lead	those	displaced	from	T	to	
reduce	their	efforts	at	realizing	it	relative	to	the	other	ends	they	pursue.	For	
instance,	their	efforts	may	be	limited	to	annual	days	of	remembrance	
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commemorating	the	unjust	expulsion	and	denial	of	return.	How	compelling	we	find	
such	practices	as	evidence	that	those	who	once	had	a	right	to	reside	in	T	continue	to	
have	living	there	among	their	ends	will	depend	on	the	extent	to	which	we	think	
them	justified	in	expending	no	more	effort	than	they	do	to	affect	their	return.		
People	wrongly	driven	from	the	territory	in	which	they	rightfully	resided	
may	subsequently	and	without	prompting	explicitly	renounce	any	right	to	return	to	
it.	Failing	that,	however,	the	only	conclusive	test	of	whether	a	person	unjustly	
displaced	from	a	particular	territory	has	abandoned	her	right	to	reside	there	is	to	
present	her	with	a	just	opportunity	to	do	so.	To	be	just,	the	opportunity	must	
involve	at	least	the	absence	of	coercion	by	the	state	in	which	she	currently	resides,	
adequate	time	to	assess	the	costs	and	benefits	of	return	in	comparison	to	continued	
residence	where	she	now	lives	(assuming	arguendo	that	she	has	a	right	to	do	so),	
and	perhaps	just	compensation	for	harms	she	suffered	as	a	result	of	her	
displacement.	A	person	with	a	right	to	reside	in	T	who	does	not	take	advantage	of	
her	just	opportunity	to	once	again	reside	in	it	thereby	abandons	her	right	to	
residence	in	T.	Or,	hedging	just	a	bit,	there	is	compelling	evidence	in	such	a	case	that	
the	person	in	question	no	longer	has	residence	in	T	among	her	ends,	and	having	
given	her	sufficient	opportunity	to	challenge	this	conclusion,	those	who	reside	in	T	
are	not	at	fault	for	acting	on	the	assumption	that	she	has	abandoned	her	right	to	
reside	in	it.	
In	light	of	the	foregoing	discussion,	consider	once	again	Waldron’s	(1992)	
claim	that:		
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I	may	of	course	yearn	for	the	lost	resource	and	spend	a	lot	of	time	wishing	
that	I	had	it	back.	I	may	even	organize	my	life	around	the	campaign	for	its	
restoration.	But	that	is	not	the	same	thing	as	the	basis	of	the	original	claim	(p.	
19;	see	also	2004,	p.	261).		
I	concede	the	last	claim;	the	basis	of	an	agent’s	original	claim	to	reside	in	T	is	
grounded	in	her	formation	and	pursuit,	while	living	in	T,	of	a	conception	of	the	good	
territorially	grounded	there.	Contra	Waldron,	however,	it	does	not	follow	that	a	
person	retains	the	right	to	reside	in	T	only	if	she	currently	or	recently	pursued	that	
conception	of	the	good	in	T.	It	depends	on	whether	her	failure	to	do	so	is	the	result	
of	ongoing	unjust	treatment	by	those	who	control	access	to	T.	If	so,	then	whether	
she	organizes	her	life	around	a	campaign	for	the	restoration	of	her	right	to	reside	in	
T	does	make	a	difference	to	whether	she	retains	that	right.		Such	a	campaign	
demonstrates	that	she	has	not	abandoned	as	one	of	her	ends	the	pursuit	of	a	
conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T.		The	import	of	yearning	or	
wishing	for	return	to	T	requires	more	detail	than	Waldron	provides,	since	in	some	
circumstances	competing	demands	of	justice	or	the	struggle	to	secure	one’s	own	and	
one’s	family	survival	may	leave	no	time	or	effort	to	do	more	than	yearn	for	return	to	
T.		To	deny	that	such	a	person	retains	a	right	to	reside	in	T	would	be	to	add	new	
injury	to	old.	
Neither	the	passage	of	a	lengthy	period	of	time	nor	stable	legal	residence	
elsewhere	entails	the	loss	of	a	right	to	reside	in	T.	Rather,	generally	speaking	what	
both	do	is	make	it	more	likely	that	those	with	a	right	to	reside	in	T	will	abandon	
their	claim	to	do	so.	The	more	those	unjustly	displaced	and	their	descendants	fully	
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integrate	into	the	society	present	in	the	territory	on	which	they	now	live,	and	the	
more	they	lead	what	they	view	as	materially	and	spiritually	flourishing	lives	there,	
the	less	appealing	return	will	be.	Conversely,	the	less	they	integrate,	and	the	less	
materially	and	spiritually	fulfilling	their	lives,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	hold	on	to	
the	end	of	residing	in	T.	Ultimately,	however,	retention	of	a	right	of	return	rests	on	
the	will	of	those	who	enjoy	it	–	that	is,	whether	they	include	return	to	T	among	their	
ends	–	and	not	on	whether	it	is	in	their	interest	to	exercise	it.			
III	
	 All	else	equal,	those	unjustly	displaced	from	a	particular	territory	T	in	which	
they	rightfully	reside	enjoy	a	right	of	return	to	it	unless	and	until	they	voluntarily	
abandon	their	right	to	residence	there.	In	this	section	I	examine	two	ways	in	which	
all	else	may	not	be	equal,	each	of	which	has	implications	for	the	precise	remedy	to	
which	those	unjustly	denied	residence	in	T	are	entitled	as	a	result	of	the	wrong	done	
to	them.	First,	those	who	now	reside	in	T	enjoy	certain	basic	rights	respect	for	which	
takes	priority	over	respect	for	unjustly	displaced	individuals’	rights	to	return	to	T.9	
This	is	true	even	for	current	residents	of	T	morally	at	fault	for	the	initial	unjust	
displacement	and/or	the	persistent	injustice	of	refusing	return	to	those	entitled	to	
reside	in	T.		Second,	and	more	controversially,	I	contend	that	even	such	agents	can	
acquire	rights	to	reside	in	T	if	they	form	and	pursue	a	conception	of	the	good	that	is	
territorially	grounded	there.	These	rights	of	residence	may	limit	claims	to	return	on	
the	part	of	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T	(or	perhaps	their	descendants)	even	
when	other	basic	rights	do	not.	
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The	following	example	offers	some	support	for	the	claim	that	respect	for	
certain	basic	rights	take	priority	over	the	correction	of	past	injustice.10		At	time	t1,	a	
number	of	group’s	–	the	E’s,	the	F’s,	and	the	G’s	–	enjoy	legitimate	possession	of	their	
waterholes	–	He,	Hf,	and	Hg.	At	time	t2,	‘motivated	purely	by	greed,	members	of	
group	F	descend	on	the	waterhole	Hg,	which	is	used	and	possessed	by	group	G,	and	
(using	violence)	insist	on	sharing	Hg	with	G.’	In	doing	so,	they	commit	an	injustice;	
though	they	draw	water	from	Hg,	they	have	no	right	to	do	so.	Members	of	group	F	
also	continue	to	draw	water	from	Hf.		Subsequently,	however,	the	region	suffers	an	
ecological	disaster,	and	Hf	dries	up.	When	this	happens	–	call	it	time	t3	–	I	maintain	
that	members	of	group	F	acquire	a	right	to	draw	water	from	Hg.	Whereas	prior	to	
the	ecological	disaster	group	G	would	have	been	justified	in	denying	members	of	
group	F	access	to	their	waterhole	if	they	were	able	to	do	so,	once	that	waterhole	
becomes	the	only	place	where	members	of	group	F	can	satisfy	their	need	for	water,	
group	G	no	longer	has	a	right	to	deny	them	access	to	it.			
In	his	discussion	of	the	above	example	Waldron	stipulates	that	at	time	t3	the	
only	way	for	the	unjust	aggressors	to	meet	their	need	for	water	is	to	draw	it	from	
the	waterhole	they	wrongly	seized	at	time	t2.		Yet	this	stipulation	may	frequently	
fail	to	accord	with	reality,	whether	what	is	at	issue	is	secure	access	to	water	or	to	
residence	in	a	territory	where	one	can	meet	all	one’s	basic	needs	and	form	and	
pursue	some	conception	of	the	good.	Unlike	in	the	example,	there	may	be	no	
physical	barriers	that	prevent	those	who	unjustly	displaced	the	previous,	rightful,	
residents	of	T	from	relocating	to	some	other	territory	where	they	can	securely	meet	
their	basic	needs.	Of	course,	as	a	practical	matter,	those	residing	in	other	territories	
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may	refuse	to	admit	the	displacers	or	their	descendants.	Speaking	of	non-aboriginal	
New	Zealanders,	Waldron	(2004)	maintains	that	they	could	not	reasonably	be	
expected	to	move	en	masse	because	‘…the	government	of	their	ancestral	homeland	
[the	U.K.]	has	long	since	made	it	clear	that	they	would	not	be	welcome’	(p.	255).		
From	the	standpoint	of	moral	theory,	however,	the	first	question	we	ought	to	ask	is	
not	what	those	residing	in	other	places	including,	but	perhaps	not	limited	to,	the	
ancestral	homeland	will	do	when	it	comes	to	admitting	the	unjust	displacers	and	
their	descendants	into	their	territories.		Rather,	we	should	ask	what	they	ought	to	
do.11		Ensuring	that	those	now	living	in	T	continue	to	enjoy	secure	access	to	basic	
nutrition,	clean	drinking	water,	etc.,	even	after	those	unjustly	denied	residence	in	T	
return	to	it	does	not	necessarily	require	that	they	continue	to	reside	there.	To	the	
extent	that	the	basic	rights	of	the	current	inhabitants	constrain	the	remediation	of	
the	wrong	done	to	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T,	the	latter	may	well	wonder	why	
they	should	have	to	bear	such	a	large	portion	of	the	cost	involved	in	correcting	the	
injustice	they	suffered.		Suppose,	contrary	to	Waldron’s	stipulation,	that	at	time	t3	it	
were	possible	to	move	some	of	the	unjust	aggressors	residing	around	Hg	to	He	
without	denying	either	those	who	were	moved	to	He	or	those	already	residing	there	
access	to	an	adequate	supply	of	water.	In	that	case,	why	think	the	original	rightful	
residents	of	Hf	must	bear	the	full	cost	imposed	by	an	increase	in	the	number	of	
people	with	a	right	to	access	a	given	waterhole,	rather	than	sharing	it	out	between	
themselves	and	the	original	rightful	residents	of	He?	Likewise	in	the	case	of	people	
unjustly	displaced	from	territory	T,	why	not	shift	more	of	the	cost	created	by	their	
unjust	treatment	on	to	T’s	current	inhabitants,	say	by	requiring	some	of	them	to	
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relocate	from	T	to	their	ancestral	homeland?	Indeed,	the	current	inhabitants	of	the	
ancestral	homeland,	or	the	state	that	rules	it,	may	have	an	obligation	to	rectify	the	
wrong	in	question.	If	so,	then	might	that	obligation	involve	allowing	the	current	
inhabitants	of	T	to	resettle	in	their	territory,	thereby	increasing	the	ability	of	the	
unjustly	displaced	to	(re)-create	the	lives	they	wish	to	lead	there?			
What	these	questions	leave	out	is	the	possibility	that	the	current	inhabitants	
of	T	enjoy	rights	of	residence	there;	a	claim	against	others	that	they	not	interfere	in	
certain	ways	with	their	pursuit	of	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	
T.	Unlike	their	rights	to	adequate	nutrition,	clean	drinking	water,	etc.,	the	present	
inhabitants	of	T	cannot	enjoy	their	right	to	reside	there	anywhere	else.	If	the	present	
inhabitants	of	T	do	enjoy	rights	of	residence	there,	then	these	rights	explain	why	
those	returning	to	T	must	accept	constraints	on	their	opportunities	to	form	and	
pursue	conceptions	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	that	place	–	even	if	is	
possible,	physically	and	even	practically,	for	the	current	inhabitants	to	enjoy	their	
other	rights	(to	adequate	nutrition,	etc.)	elsewhere.					
Who	among	T’s	current	inhabitants	might	enjoy	a	right	to	reside	there?		I	
contend	that	any	individual	who	has	developed	a	conception	of	the	good	sufficiently	
territorially	grounded	in	T	thereby	acquires	a	right	to	reside	in	it.		This	includes	
those	who	unjustly	displaced	the	previous	rightful	occupants	of	T,	or	who	knowingly	
took	advantage	of	their	displacement	to	settle	in	that	territory.		As	I	will	now	argue,	
neither	a	violation	of	others’	right	to	reside	in	T	nor	a	violation	of	their	right	to	
control	entry	into	and	settlement	in	T,	if	they	have	such	a	right,	precludes	an	
individual	from	acquiring	a	right	to	reside	there.	Furthermore,	I	offer	a	preliminary	
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defense	of	the	claim	that	just	punishment	for	either	of	the	aforementioned	rights	
violations	will	not	include	forcible	expulsion	from	T	if	the	wrongdoers	have	
acquired	rights	to	reside	there.	If	successful,	these	arguments	entail	that	the	
wrongdoers’	rights	to	reside	in	T,	as	well	as	those	of	any	innocent	inhabitants	of	T	
who	meet	the	condition	for	a	right	to	reside	there,	will	constrain	exactly	where	and	
to	what	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T	are	entitled	to	return.				
Suppose	borders	ought	to	be	open.	If	so,	then	it	is	not	clear	why	individuals	
who	enter	some	territory	T,	unjustly	expel	the	people	living	there,	and	then	proceed	
to	form	and	pursue	conceptions	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T	cannot	
acquire	rights	of	residence	there.	They	have	a	duty	to	repair	the	wrong	they	have	
done	to	those	they	unjustly	displaced,	of	course,	and	discharging	that	duty	may	
require	that	they	make	significant	compromises	to	the	pursuit	of	their	territorially	
grounded	conceptions	of	the	good.	They	may	also	be	liable	to	punishment	for	the	
injustices	they	committed.	Nevertheless,	the	unjust	displacers	did	nothing	wrong	
merely	be	entering	the	territory	and	forming	and	pursuing	conceptions	of	the	good	
essentially	linked	to	it.	Had	they	done	so	without	displacing	any	of	those	rightfully	
living	in	T	they	would	have	acquired	rights	of	residence	there,	at	least	on	the	
autonomy-based	account	of	such	rights	under	discussion	in	this	paper.	Should	we	
not	draw	the	same	conclusion	even	in	a	case	where,	as	part	of	their	creating	a	life	in	
T,	they	forcibly	displaced	those	who	previously	lived	there?12	Note	that	these	
individuals	meet	the	no-fault	condition	that	Stilz	(2011,	p.	585)	places	on	the	
acquisition	of	a	right	to	reside	in	T.		Given	open	borders,	they	do	no	wrong	merely	
by	forming	and	pursuing	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T.	Stilz	
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might	object	that	the	way	in	which	they	do	so,	namely	one	that	involves	forcibly	
displacing	the	previous	residents,	does	render	them	at	fault	for	forming	their	
connection	to	T,	and	so	blocks	their	acquisition	of	a	right	to	reside	in	it.	But	to	
simply	assert	this	is	to	beg	the	question;	we	need	to	know	why	the	unjust	
displacement	of	those	who	rightly	resided	in	T	not	only	calls	for	punishment	and	
repair	but	also	undermines	the	displacers’	acquisition	of	a	right	to	reside	there.		
Might	expulsion	from	territory	T	constitute	a	justifiable	form	of	punishment	
for	those	who	unjustly	displaced	the	individuals	rightfully	residing	in	T,	even	if	the	
displacers	subsequently	formed	and	pursued	conceptions	of	the	good	territorially	
grounded	there?13	The	answer	to	this	question	depends	on	an	account	of	just	
punishment.	Perhaps	such	a	punishment	could	be	defended	on	the	basis	of	its	
deterrent	effect;	knowing	that	if	they	unjustly	displace	those	already	residing	in	T	
they	risk	expulsion	from	the	territory	in	which	they	have	settled	and	built	their	own	
lives,	immigrants	to	T	would	refrain	from	doing	so.	It	is	also	possible,	though,	that	a	
consequentialist	approach	would	only	sanction	a	lesser	form	of	punishment	once	it	
took	into	account	the	harm	the	unjust	displacers	would	suffer	as	a	result	of	their	
own	expulsion.14	Alternatively,	a	classical	retributivist	account	of	just	punishment,	
one	that	takes	literally	and	generalizes	from	the	injunction	to	exact	an	eye	for	an	
eye,	might	justify	the	expulsion	from	T	of	those	at	fault	for	unjustly	displacing	those	
who	previously	and	rightfully	resided	there.	But	one	reason	classical	retributivism	
garners	little	support	from	those	who	think	critically	about	the	justifiability	of	
punishment	is	that	it	sanctions	cruel	treatment	no	person	ought	to	suffer,	such	as	
the	torturing	of	torturers.	Arguably	the	forced	expulsion	of	an	unjust	displacer	who	
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has	resided	in	T	for	many	decades,	during	which	time	he	has	formed	and	pursued	a	
conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	there,	would	constitute	cruel	
treatment	of	this	type.	If	so,	then	just	as	the	torturer’s	wrongdoing	does	not	deprive	
him	of	a	right	not	to	be	tortured,	so	too	the	unjust	displacer’s	wrongful	expulsion	of	
those	with	a	right	to	reside	in	T	does	not	deprive	him	of	a	right	to	reside	there	if	he	
has	formed	and	pursued	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T.			
This	last	point	holds,	I	suggest,	even	if	those	who	reside	in	a	given	territory,	
and	who	govern	themselves	via	the	political	and	legal	institutions	of	a	legitimate	
state,	have	a	right	to	control	entry	into	and	settlement	in	that	territory.	As	the	above	
stipulation	of	open	borders	reveals,	it	is	this	right	to	border	control	and	not	the	right	
to	residence	that	is	germane	to	the	question	of	whether	those	at	fault	for	(wrongly)	
forming	and	pursuing	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T	may	
nevertheless	acquire	a	right	to	reside	there.	Suppose	that	individuals	who	organize	
their	lives	together	via	the	institutions	of	a	single	legitimate	state	enjoy	a	prima	facie	
right	to	deny	others	entry	to	the	state’s	territory,	one	grounded	in	the	non-
instrumental	value	of	political	self-determination.	Does	it	also	justify	their	expelling	
individuals	who	have	violated	that	right	by	entering	the	territory	without	
permission?		The	answer	depends	on	the	extent	to	which	the	individuals	in	question	
have	developed	conceptions	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	there	(Carens,	2010).		
The	structure	of	territorially	grounded	relationships,	goals,	and	projects	(the	
integrity	of	which	a	right	to	residence	serves	to	protect)	typically	develops	over	
time.	The	right	that	protects	it	emerges	only	once	the	structure	reaches	a	certain	
stage	of	development,	just	as	a	heap	of	sand	emerges	at	some	(perhaps	
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indeterminate)	point	from	the	continued	addition	of	grains	of	sand.	As	with	the	
heap,	there	will	be	cases	in	which	a	person	has	clearly	developed	a	territorially	
grounded	conception	of	the	good	sufficient	to	warrant	a	right	to	residence.	There	
will	be	other	cases	in	which	the	opposite	is	true,	and	a	third	set	of	cases	in	which	no	
principled	conclusion	may	be	drawn	(either	because	there	is	no	answer	or	because	
we	cannot	know	it).	Suppose	that	the	typical	recent	wrongful	immigrant	to	T	fails	to	
develop	a	conception	of	the	good	sufficiently	territorially	grounded	in	that	territory	
to	generate	the	emergence	of	a	right	to	reside	there.	Though	her	expulsion	by	those	
we	are	assuming	have	a	right	to	control	who	enters	and	settles	in	the	territory	may	
damage	some	of	her	relationships,	projects,	etc.,	it	will	not	wrong	her	per	se	(though	
depending	on	how	her	expulsion	is	carried	out,	she	may	suffer	other	wrongs).	In	
contrast,	a	person	who	wrongly	immigrated	to	T	decades	ago	will	typically	have	
developed	a	territorially	grounded	conception	of	the	good	that	exceeds	the	
threshold	at	which	a	right	to	residence	emerges.15	Once	she	enjoys	a	right	to	reside	
in	T,	no	appeal	to	the	value	of	political	self-determination	can	justify	denying	her	
that	right.	Were	we	to	conclude	otherwise,	the	way	would	be	open	to	justify	by	
appeal	to	the	non-instrumental	value	of	political	self-determination	a	majority’s	
decision	to	revoke	the	rights	to	reside	in	T	of	a	native	born	minority.16	I	suggest	that	
the	hierarchy	or	priority	of	rights	runs	the	other	way;	that	is,	the	right	to	residence	
is	one	of	a	set	of	rights	that	constrains	the	permissible	exercise	of	the	right	to	
political	self-determination.	The	upshot	is	that	those	who	wrongly	immigrated	to	a	
state’s	territory	decades	ago	are	not	morally	liable	to	deportation.	Rather,	they	have	
a	right	to	a	path	to	citizenship,	albeit	one	that	may	include	submission	to	some	kind	
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of	punishment,	such	as	the	payment	of	a	fine,	for	the	wrong	they	did	when	they	
entered	and	first	began	to	settle	in	that	territory.	
A	critic	might	challenge	the	argument	set	out	in	the	preceding	paragraphs	by	
pointing	out	that	a	trespasser	cannot	acquire	a	property	right	in	land	or	in	a	house	
simply	by	forming	and	pursuing	a	conception	of	the	good	that	involves	or	presumes	
continued	residence	in,	or	use	of,	it.		The	following	considerations	strike	me	as	
promising	starting	points	for	a	rebuttal	to	this	challenge,	though	space	does	not	
permit	me	to	develop	the	arguments	in	detail.		First,	the	critic’s	assertion	is	at	odds	
with	the	common	law	doctrine	of	adverse	possession,	according	to	which	under	
certain	conditions	trespassers	can	acquire	title	to	another’s	property.		Perhaps	a	
person	who	wrongfully	settles	in	a	given	territory	can	meet	those	same	conditions;	
it	will	depend,	for	example,	on	what	qualifies	as	open	and	notorious	presence	in	that	
territory,	which	requires	in	turn	a	normative	account	of	what	counts	as	due	
diligence	on	the	part	of	a	state	vis-à-vis	enforcing	its	immigration	restrictions.		The	
suggestion	here	is	that	the	same	line	of	reasoning	that	serves	to	morally	justify	the	
doctrine	of	adverse	possession	may	also	justify	a	moral	principle	of	“adverse	
residence.”17		Second,	typically	the	loss	of	wrongfully	acquired	goods,	including	real	
property,	will	not	be	destructive	of	the	entire	life	a	person	leads.		In	contrast,	
expulsion	from	the	place	in	which	an	individual’s	conception	of	the	good	is	
territorially	grounded	often	severs	all	of	a	person’s	social	ties,	her	geographical	
familiarity	with	a	place,	her	sense	of	being	at	home	in	the	culture	(or	at	least	one	of	
the	sub-cultures)	of	the	society	in	which	she	lives,	and	her	ability	to	pursue	almost	
all	of	the	various	projects	to	which	she	is	committed.18		Even	if	the	resulting	set	back	
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to	a	person’s	pursuit	of	the	good	in	these	two	cases	is	only	a	difference	in	degree	and	
not	in	kind,	it	may	suffice	to	explain	why	a	person	can	acquire	a	right	to	reside	in	a	
territory	he	wrongfully	enters	and	lives	in,	but	cannot	acquire	a	property	right	in	
goods	he	wrongfully	uses.19	Finally,	theorists	such	as	Stilz	may	prove	too	much	if	
they	employ	this	reductio,	since	the	intuitions	generated	by	appeal	to	cases	
involving	trespass	and	theft	may	also	undermine	their	claim	that	those	who	
faultlessly	form	conceptions	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	T	thereby	acquire	
a	right	to	reside	there.20	
In	legal	circles	it	is	sometimes	said	that	the	loss	of	a	remedy	amounts	to	the	
loss	of	a	right.	My	goal	in	this	section	has	been	to	explore	whether	the	same	
conclusion	can	be	drawn	for	the	moral	right	to	residence.		Specifically,	I	have	
examined	whether	competing	considerations	of	justice	might	rule	out	the	possibility	
of	return	to	some	territory	T	on	the	part	of	those	unjustly	displaced	from	it,	which	
would	amount	to	their	loss	of	a	right	to	reside	there.	Though	the	answer	to	this	
question	is	always	situation	specific,	I	think	it	plausible	to	conclude	that	some	
limited	right	of	return	will	likely	be	possible,	or	at	least	would	be	if	all	parties	were	
to	act	morally.	In	reaching	that	conclusion,	however,	I	have	also	sought	to	
demonstrate	that	the	precise	remedy	to	which	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T	are	
entitled	–	to	what	sort	of	society,	economy,	and	polity	they	are	entitled	to	return	–	
may	be	substantially	constrained	by	various	rights	enjoyed	by	those	who	now	
inhabit	T,	including	their	right	to	reside	there.	This	is	so,	moreover,	even	if	the	
current	residents	of	T	include	many	of	those	responsible	for	the	initial	unjust	
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displacement	and/or	the	persistent	refusal	to	allow	the	return	of	those	they	
displaced	(or,	perhaps,	their	descendants).		
Were	those	wrongly	denied	their	right	to	reside	in	T	to	recognize	the	specific	
nature	of	the	return	to	which	they	are	entitled,	it	is	possible	that	some	of	them	
would	abandon	their	right.	That	is,	these	individuals	may	retain	return	to	T	among	
their	ends	only	because	they	have	mistaken	beliefs	as	to	the	sort	of	future	in	T	they	
may	justifiably	demand.	Were	those	beliefs	corrected,	they	may	no	longer	rank	
residence	in	T	over	living	wherever	they	now	reside.	If	so,	then	while	the	competing	
moral	considerations	that	constrain	the	right	of	return	will	only	rarely	exhaust	its	
possibility	altogether,	they	may	sometimes	lead	to	the	same	outcome,	namely	the	
loss	of	a	right	to	reside	in	T,	by	motivating	those	who	have	it	to	abandon	their	claim.			
*	 *	 *	
The	plausibility	of	a	theory	of	the	right	to	reside	in	a	particular	territory	
depends	both	on	its	account	of	how	individuals	acquire	such	rights	and	its	account	
of	what	follows	in	the	event	of	violations	of	these	rights.		I	touched	briefly	on	the	
first	of	these	two	elements	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper,	where	I	maintained	that	
individuals	who	form	and	pursue	a	conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	in	
a	particular	place	have	a	prima	facie	moral	right	to	reside	there.		Such	individuals	
enjoy	a	claim	against	others	that	they	respect	the	right-bearers’	personal	autonomy	
by,	at	a	minimum,	not	forcibly	displacing	them	from	that	territory.		My	main	focus,	
however,	has	been	on	the	second	of	the	aforementioned	elements	of	a	theory	of	
residence	rights,	as	I	have	sought	to	develop	a	novel	account	of	what	follows	in	the	
event	that	individuals	suffer	violations	of	their	rights	to	reside	in	some	territory	T.		I	
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argued	first	that	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T	cannot	involuntarily	lose	their	
rights	to	reside	there.		If	these	individuals	are	unjustly	prevented	from	returning	to	
T,	then	as	long	as	they	retain	return	to	T	among	their	ends	they	continue	to	enjoy	a	
right	to	do	so,	even	if	they	also	develop	a	conception	of	the	good	many	elements	of	
which	are	grounded	in	the	territory	where	they	now	live.		I	then	argued	that	
considerations	commonly	associated	with	the	loss	of	rights	to	reside	in	T,	such	as	
the	development	of	life	plans	premised	on	residence	elsewhere,	do	not	themselves	
entail	the	loss	of	those	rights.		Rather,	they	provide	evidence	that	the	unjustly	
displaced	individuals	have	renounced	their	rights	to	reside	in	T,	or	would	do	so	if	
given	a	just	opportunity	to	return	to	it.		Finally,	I	considered	two	types	of	
countervailing	moral	claims	that	might	limit	or	even	rule	out	altogether	the	return	
of	those	unjustly	displaced	from	T.		The	ability	of	T’s	current	residents	to	meet	their	
basic	needs	may	do	so,	I	suggested,	though	in	principle	ensuring	that	they	are	able	to	
meet	their	basic	needs	does	not	require	that	they	continue	to	reside	in	T.		Respect	
for	the	current	residents’	rights	to	reside	in	T,	in	contrast,	gives	them	a	weighty	
claim	to	remain	there,	with	significant	implications	for	what	exactly	those	unjustly	
displaced	from	T	can	expect	to	return	to.		A	crucial	question,	then,	is	whether	those	
at	fault	for	wrongfully	displacing	the	rightful	residents	of	T	can	acquire	rights	to	
reside	there.		I	answered	that	they	can,	arguing	that	the	acquisition	of	a	right	to	
reside	in	T	depends	solely	on	whether	a	person	develops	a	conception	of	the	good	
territorially	grounded	there.		While	unjust	entry	into	a	territory	and	unjust	
displacement	of	those	residing	there	render	a	person	liable	to	punishment	and,	at	
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least	in	the	latter	case,	to	claims	for	compensation,	neither	precludes	that	person	
acquiring	a	right	to	reside	in	it.						
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condition	for	an	individual’s	rightful	pursuit	of	a	territorially	grounded	conception	
of	the	good.	If	so,	then	at	least	all	else	equal	forcible	displacement	of	such	an	
individual	from	the	territory	in	which	he	lives	wrongs	him.		I	think	Simmons	is	right	
on	this	point,	which	is	why	I	employ	in	my	argument	the	notion	of	a	right	of	
residence,	which	unlike	Stilz’s	right	of	occupancy	allows	but	does	not	require	that	a	
person’s	territorially	grounded	conception	of	the	good	be	structured	by	legal	norms.		
However,	along	with	Stilz	and	Kant,	and	contra	Simmons,	I	do	think	individuals	have	
a	moral	duty	to	regulate	their	interactions	with	others	according	to	a	common	
juridical	order	(i.e.,	a	domestic	or	international	legal	order).		Thus	I	agree	with	Stilz	
that	individuals	have	a	right	to	be	physically	present	in	the	territory	where	they	
have	built	their	lives,	and	that	they	have	a	right	to	their	interactions	with	others	in	
that	place	being	regulated	by	the	legal	order	of	a	legitimate	state	(itself	subject	to	a	
legitimate	international	legal	order).		The	two	rights	are	distinct,	however,	as	
evidenced	by	the	fact	that	for	both	rights	it	is	possible	to	suffer	the	violation	of	one	
without	suffering	the	violation	of	the	other. 
2	The	conception	of	autonomy	in	play	here	requires	little	if	any	critical	reflection	on	
one’s	ends;	for	example,	it	encompasses	a	person	who	forms	and	pursues	a	specific	
conception	of	the	good	as	a	result	of	being	educated	into	the	roles	of	a	sister,	wife,	
and	mother	in	a	traditional	society.		
3	Whereas	I	treat	as	sufficient	for	A’s	enjoyment	of	a	right	of	residence	in	T	that	A	
has	resided	there	long	enough	to	form	and	pursue	a	conception	of	the	good	that	is	
territorially	grounded	in	it,	Stilz	treats	these	conditions	as	merely	necessary	and	
adds	that	A	must	not	be	at	fault	for	having	forged	this	connection	to	the	territory	in	
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question.		I	argue	in	section	III	that	Stilz	errs	in	adding	this	no-fault	condition	to	
those	an	agent	must	meet	in	order	to	acquire	a	right	to	reside	in	T.	
4	See,	e.g.	Miller	(2007)	and	Moore	(2015).		I	focus	in	the	text	on	Waldron’s	and	
Stilz’s	arguments	for	this	conclusion	because	I	find	an	account	of	individuals’	rights	
of	residence	along	the	lines	they	sketch	to	be	the	most	plausible	of	the	extant	
accounts.		
5	Waldron	(1992,	19)	largely	sidesteps	this	issue	by	positing	single,	multi-
generational,	agents	such	as	Maori	tribes	as	both	the	victims	of	past	injustices	and	
the	bearers	of	claims	to	rectification.			
6	As	I	read	her,	when	Stilz	(2011,	586)	asserts	that	for	those	who	have	resided	“for	
the	long	term”	and	enjoyed	stable	legal	residence	in	T2	“the	wrong	of	displacement	
is	superseded,”	she	means	that	these	individuals	have	no	right	to	reside	in,	and	so	no	
right	to	return	to,	the	territory	T	from	which	they	(or	their	forebearers)	were	
unjustly	displaced.	
7	In	fact,	Stilz’s	(2011,	585-586)	account	of	rights	of	occupancy	entails	that	this	
conclusion	holds	even	for	the	“ancestors"	(i.e.,	those	who	actually	suffered	the	
unjust	displacement),	and	not	merely	their	descendants.	
8	Perhaps	they	would	have	taken	the	opportunity	to	assume	certain	kinds	of	control	
over	places	of	particular	symbolic	significance,	such	as	particular	cemeteries	or	
churches,	and	of	a	right	to	visit	such	sites.		I	believe	they	have	a	prima	facie	right	to	
both	of	these,	but	such	opportunities	fall	far	short	of	residence.	
9	Were	the	return	to	T	of	all	of	the	unjustly	displaced	to	overtax	the	river	system	that	
provides	the	only	source	of	water	for	people	in	T	and	several	other	territories,	the	
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rights	of	residents	in	other	territories	to	use	the	river	to	meet	their	basic	need	for	
water	might	also	limit	the	unjustly	displaced	people’s	right	of	return.	
10	The	example	is	Waldron’s	(2004,	p.	241).	
11	To	maintain	that	this	is	the	first	question	we	ought	to	ask	when	doing	moral	
theory	does	not	entail	that	it	will	be	the	most	important	question	to	ask	in	all	
contexts,	of	course.	
12		Suppose	that,	in	the	process	of	forming	and	pursuing	their	conceptions	of	the	
good,	the	new	immigrants	to	territory	T	unjustly	violate	the	property	rights	of	those	
already	living	there	but	do	not	displace	them	from	the	territory.		Here,	too,	while	the	
wrongdoers	clearly	ought	to	repair	the	wrongs	they	have	done,	and	it	is	at	least	
permissible	to	punish	them	for	the	injustices	they	committed,	it	is	far	from	obvious	
that	their	wrongdoing	bars	them	from	acquiring	rights	of	residence	in	T.	
13	For	simplicity’s	sake,	I	assume	that	all	and	only	the	agents	responsible	for	the	
unjust	displacement	of	T’s	previous	rightful	residents	subsequently	settle	in	T.		
Matters	may	often	be	more	complicated,	with	some	of	those	responsible	for	the	
unjust	displacement	not	taking	up	residence	in	T,	and	with	some	subsequent	
residents	of	T	knowingly	or	negligently	taking	advantage	of	the	wrongful	expulsion	
of	T’s	previous	inhabitants	to	settle	there,	though	they	are	not	themselves	
responsible	for	that	expulsion.		Though	important,	I	do	not	believe	these	
complications	change	the	argument	set	out	in	the	text.				
14	Moreover,	a	consequentialist	might	endorse	the	fairly	rapid	supersession	of	rights	
to	residence	(and	property)	on	the	grounds	that	stable	expectations	are	crucial	to	
activities	that	generate	increases	in	welfare.	
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15	I	employ	time	spent	in	territory	T	to	distinguish	cases	here	because	it	is	
frequently	correlated	with	the	development	of	a	territorially	grounded	conception	
of	the	good,	not	because	it	is	of	any	moral	significance	in	its	own	right.		Many	other	
factors	are	likely	relevant	as	well;	for	example,	whether	the	wrongful	immigrant	
settles	in	a	community	of	people	with	whom	he	shares	religious,	ethnic,	or	national	
ties,	whether	he	marries	or	has	children,	etc.		Cases	involving	individuals	who	enter	
and	initially	reside	in	a	territory	legally	but	who	then	remain	in	residence	after	their	
visas	expire	raise	further	complications.	
16	See	Hidalgo	(forthcoming)	for	insightful	discussion	of	this	point.		It	may	be	
tempting	to	respond	that	unlike	the	native	born	minority	the	immigrant	who	
wrongly	entered	and	settled	in	T	decades	ago	is	at	fault	for	having	formed	a	
conception	of	the	good	territorially	grounded	there.		But,	again,	why	think	that	
wrong	precludes	his	acquisition	of	a	right	to	reside	in	T,	or	that	the	permissible	
forms	of	punishment	to	which	he	is	liable	as	a	result	include	deportation?	
17	For	a	comparison	of	Lockean,	utilitarian	(economic),	and	Hegelian	personhood	
rationales	for	the	doctrine	of	adverse	possession,	the	last	of	which	may	serve	
particularly	well	as	a	basis	for	defending	the	suggestion	in	the	text,	see	Radin	
(1986).	
18	See,	for	example,	“American	Children,	Now	Struggling	to	Adjust	to	Life	in	Mexico,”	
New	York	Times,	June	18,	2012.	
19	The	view	I	defend	clearly	falls	afoul	of	the	maxim	that	no	one	ought	to	be	allowed	
to	profit	from	his	or	her	own	wrongdoing.		But	as	Ronald	Dworkin	famously	noted	
(with	reference	to	the	doctrine	of	adverse	possession),	in	common	law	jurisdictions	
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this	maxim	provides	a	consideration	that	ought	to	inform	judges	or	jurors	
assessment	of	the	(legal)	treatment	to	which	people	are	entitled,	but	not	one	that	is	
always	determinative.		I	offer	an	analogous	moral	claim:	while	in	many	cases	justice	
permits	and	perhaps	even	requires	that	we	deny	a	wrongdoer	whatever	gains	he	
realizes	as	a	result	of	his	wrongdoing,	that	is	not	so	in	the	case	at	hand	where	the	
denial	of	those	gains	would	likely	destroy	the	entirety	of	the	life	a	person	leads.	
20	See	Simmons	(2012)	for	just	such	an	argument	against	Stilz.			
